NASA's future will not be determined by its ability to return to the Moon. It will be defined by whether the agency can extend its operational reach beyond L2, into deep space, and eventually into the outer solar system. Right now, too much of NASA's strategy is focused on the Earth-Moon system—on Artemis, the Lunar Gateway, and the logistics required to support lunar exploration. While these are important stepping stones, they are not the true frontier because commercial industry has already set their sights on these locations. Cislunar space is becoming the new baseline; the real measure of American leadership in space will be NASA's ability to operate infrastructure, sustainably and autonomously far beyond the Moon.

NASA as a Resilience Engine

For decades, NASA has been far more than a space agency. It has served as one of America’s most powerful instruments of national resilience. In times of geopolitical competition, economic uncertainty, and technological stagnation, NASA has functioned as a shock absorber and a catalyst—driving breakthroughs that reinforced both America’s industrial base and its global leadership.

From miniaturized electronics and advanced materials to Earth observation systems and global positioning, NASA’s ability to scale innovations into new frontiers have continuously diffused into the broader economy, creating entirely new industries and strengthening the nation’s adaptive capacity. This adjacent invention—the ability to generate second- and third-order technologies while solving for space exploration—has been a hallmark of NASA’s contribution to national resilience.

However, that resilience function is not automatic. It depends entirely on NASA pursuing missions that force the development of new competencies—missions that stretch operational limits, challenge conventional engineering, and compel the creation of technologies and methods that cascade into the broader economy. Historically, these moments came from programs like Apollo, Viking, Voyager, and Curiosity. Today, that forcing function must come from deep space—specifically, from operations beyond L2. If NASA remains gravitationally trapped in cislunar space, it will forfeit its role as a resilience engine and shrink into a narrower, more brittle institution.

History as a Liability

NASA has leaned heavily on its legacy of achievements—Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Shuttle—as though past success guarantees future relevance. It does not. Institutional excellence can evaporate if it's not continuously renewed and sharpened to meet new challenges. The agency stands at a decision point: either become the engine driving America’s leadership in deep space, or become a historical artifact preserved more for symbolism than for impact.

This is not the first time NASA has faced contraction and the need for reinvention. But this time, there is no post-Cold War breathing room. The global competition—from China’s rapidly accelerating space program to private industry’s breakthroughs in low-cost launch—means NASA must reinvent itself while still operating.

Beyond L2: The Next Operational Frontier

The Earth-Moon Lagrange Point 2 (L2) is not the final frontier—it’s the outer edge of Earth’s influence. Beyond L2, operational physics and logistics change fundamentally:

• Propulsion: In cislunar space, chemical propulsion can handle most maneuvers because resupply and abort-to-Earth options exist. Beyond L2, high-efficiency nuclear thermal and nuclear electric propulsion (NTP/NEP) become mandatory to close mission design trades for deep space mobility.

• Navigation: Current mission planning depends heavily on Earth-based tracking and timing. Beyond L2, spacecraft must operate with autonomous celestial navigation and independently maintained time standards, creating a new framework for deep space PNT (position, navigation, and timing).

• Logistics: Resupply convoys can sustain operations in cislunar space. Beyond L2, every system—from life support to repair parts—must be fully regenerative, or capable of in-situ resource utilization (ISRU).

• Communications: Deep space communication introduces light-hour latencies, making current ground-based command and control impractical. Relay constellations, laser communication nodes, and autonomous onboard decision-making become essential.

• Radiation Protection: Earth’s magnetic field shields current astronauts from much of deep space radiation. Beyond L2, multi-year missions will require advanced radiation shielding (composite materials, electromagnetic deflection, or habitat design innovations).

The Hollowing-Out Risk

NASA’s human capital challenge is as serious as its technical one. The agency’s deep space expertise—the collective knowledge of engineers and scientists who designed, built, and operated missions to other planets—is eroding as senior personnel retire. Institutional memory that spans decades is not automatically replaced by younger hires, especially when NASA’s hiring and training pipelines are mismatched to the actual technical demands of future deep space missions.

This is not just workforce attrition; it’s a strategic loss of fluency in complex systems engineering. We’ve seen this play out before—in hypersonics, nuclear propulsion, and advanced manufacturing—where atrophied expertise led to costly, delayed restarts decades later. If NASA allows its deep space competence to vanish, it will not only set back its own programs—it will undermine America’s entire space industrial base.

The Gravitational Trap

The Artemis program—while necessary for geopolitical signaling and coalition-building—has inadvertently reinforced a gravitational mindset. Almost every system being developed for Artemis assumes proximity to Earth: regular resupply, fast abort options, and tight integration with terrestrial mission control.

This Earth-centric approach is fundamentally incompatible with deep space missions. NASA must break free from this mindset. Every major investment—whether in propulsion, habitats, or logistics—should be stress-tested against a single criterion: Does this work beyond L2? If not, it’s a dead-end technology for true deep space exploration.

Strategic and Economic Imperatives Beyond L2

Deep space exploration is not just about science; it directly intersects with future economic and national security priorities:

• Asteroid Resource Utilization: The asteroid belt offers vast supplies of platinum group metals, volatiles, and rare earth elements—resources critical for advanced manufacturing and energy systems. Mastering extraction and processing at distance defines future economic primacy.

• Heliophysics and Space Weather Dominance: Deep space sensors, stationed beyond L2, will provide the early warning infrastructure necessary to predict solar storms that could cripple terrestrial power grids and disrupt military space assets.

• Planetary Defense: Detecting and intercepting near-Earth objects requires forward-deployed assets in deep space. Waiting until an object is within cislunar space is strategically negligent.

• Logistics Prepositioning: Sustained Mars operations, asteroid mining, and outer planet missions all require pre-positioned depots, robotic tenders, and autonomous resupply chains—capabilities that don’t exist today.

Theoretical Roadmap: Deep Space Capability by 2035

NASA must adopt a phased strategy that shifts its center of gravity beyond L2, with clear operational goals and capability milestones.

A realistic roadmap looks something like this:

Phase 1: Technology Acceleration (2025-2028)

• Flight demonstration of both nuclear thermal and nuclear electric propulsion.

• Deployment of autonomous deep space navigation systems.

• First operational test of regenerative, closed-loop life support beyond L2.

• Establishment of a deep space timing standard, independent of Earth.

• Launch of the first deep space laser relay at Earth-Sun L1.

Phase 2: Operational Prototyping (2028-2031)

• Human-tended habitat deployed at Earth-Sun L2, simulating Mars-class isolation.

• Autonomous in-space manufacturing and self-repair demonstrations.

• Assembly and flight of the first autonomous deep space logistics vehicle.

• Full operational test of an autonomous deep space supply chain.

Phase 3: Doctrine Development (2031-2035)

• First crewed mission to a near-Earth asteroid, using NTP.

• Permanent deep space logistics station deployed in Mars orbit.

• Autonomous planetary defense asset network established.

• Formal creation of a government-commercial deep space logistics consortium.

NASA’s Binary Choice

NASA is no longer just competing against its own legacy; it is competing against time, against bureaucratic inertia, and against rivals that are moving faster and more deliberately into deep space. The decisions NASA makes in the next five years will determine whether the agency leads humanity into the outer solar system—or becomes a historical caretaker, curating past glories while others set the new rules.

History does not reward those who manage graceful decline. It remembers those who seized the frontier. If NASA wants to be remembered as the architect of humanity’s deep space future, it must act now—and act decisively.

China’s AI Strategy (2017–2025): A System Designed for Strategic Dominance

China’s formal AI strategy began with the New Generation AI Development Plan (AIDP), issued by the State Council in July 2017. Prior to this, China had been investing in AI through its broader industrial and technology modernization efforts, including the "Made in China 2025" initiative and earlier AI research programs led by the Chinese Academy of Sciences. These efforts laid the foundation for the 2017 AIDP, providing a pathway for China to rapidly scale its AI ambitions with a clear national roadmap. The plan outlined a three-phase roadmap for China to achieve global AI leadership by 2030, focusing on economic, military, and social applications of AI.

• The first phase (2017–2020) focused on achieving parity with global AI leaders by investing in core technologies such as machine learning, computer vision, and natural language processing.

• The second phase (2021–2025) emphasizes AI-enabled industrial transformation and the creation of world-class innovation hubs.

• The final phase (2026–2030) envisions China as the undisputed leader in AI technologies, ethics, and governance.

China is right on track. As the AIDP states in its second phase,

"by 2025, China will achieve major breakthroughs in basic theories for AI, such that some technologies and applications achieve a world-leading level..."

Exactly on January 20, 2025—the day of the US Presidential Inauguration and on the eve of the Chinese New Year—China’s DeepSeek foundation lab released its R1 model and variants, which outperformed OpenAI’s leading O1 model at just 1% of the cost to run.

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How: the Role of MOST & NDRC

China’s approach is deeply centralized. Following the State Council’s 2017 AIDP directive, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which oversees funding and governance, and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) spearheaded implementation. MOST is at the helm of turning AIDP’s vision into reality by closely collaborating with local interests (also party controlled), while the NDRC provides long-term tracking, oversight, and management of funds (to party controlled entities).

MOST has designated leading Chinese technology companies to spearhead national AI innovation platforms, each focusing on specific applications (e.g., health, cities, and manufacturing). For example, Baidu was appointed to lead in autonomous driving, Alibaba in smart city development, and Tencent in medical diagnostics. These companies focus on building nation-state platforms to foster collaboration between industry and academia, inclusive of societal advancement to accelerate the development and deployment of AI technologies across various sectors.

Unlike the US, which funds hundreds of competitors to create technology ecosystems, China creates a rival of equals, ensuring that select firms compete at a high level within a structured and state-supported ecosystem on nation-state priorities. This approach fosters rapid iteration and refinement of AI applications within a political governance structure, allowing breakthroughs to be integrated into national priorities without the inefficiencies of excessive market fragmentation. By contrast, the US system, while fostering competition, often lacks long-term strategic cohesion to translate innovation into unified national advantages. Unlike China’s model of selecting and backing companies through direct government involvement to ensure alignment with state priorities, the US relies on market-driven forces, which can lead to fragmentation and inefficiencies in scaling AI capabilities by creating a rivalry of capabilities.

MOST has also initiated aggressive programs to cultivate AI talent, directly integrating AI courses into university curricula, establishing research institutes, and promoting interdisciplinary studies. The government-driven approach is markedly different from the US University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs)—China directly shapes coursework and research direction to ensure alignment with national priorities where as the US merely funds affiliated centers (some of which are not even within geographic line of site of the main campus).

MOST facilitates the exchange of knowledge and best practices, through domestic and international forums, as well, positioning China as a key player in the global AI community. We can ascertain that China has figured out how to make conferences, effective. MOST also facilitated research funding, partnerships with universities, and the establishment of AI standards to ensure the cohesive development of the technology. Overall, the ministry has implemented policies to create a favorable environment for AI innovation, including tax incentives, grants, and the establishment of AI-focused industrial parks.

Hangzhou: A Model of State-Driven Innovation

China’s AI strategy integrates local and national government priorities. The NDRC allocated funding to establish AI innovation hubs, such as Hangzhou’s China Artificial Intelligence Town, which became a focal point for integrating AI research, entrepreneurship, and infrastructure. Hangzhou’s main academic institution, Zhejiang University, has become a leading AI organization given both Hangzhou’s designation as an AI town and MOSTs influence at the University. The university is where DS’s founder studied and where much of DS’s talent is drawn.

Hangzhou’s local government, a CCP party aligned organization, provided additional support to AI companies through tax incentives, subsidized real estate, and infrastructure investments, aligning regional initiatives with national goals. Hangzhou is central to China's AIDP strategy and largely missed by analysts. As of 2024, Hangzhou's GDP exceeded 2.18T yuan, approximately $299B, which rivals San Francisco's GDP. Hangzhou has been recognized as a leading city in AI development, ranking second in national assessments. This recognition reflects the city's robust AI ecosystem, characterized by a high number of AI-related patents and significant projects like Alibaba's "City Brain 2.0," which is widely deployed within the city. Hangzhou researchers at Alibaba led the development of and participated in China's pioneering City Brain project starting in 2016, which for Hangzhou saw, "ambulance response time dropped by 50% and the average travel time dropped by 15.3%. Moreover, the accuracy of traffic incident real-time detection reaches 95%."

A Bit About DeepSeek

DeepSeek, founded in 2023 as an offshoot of the quantitative hedge fund High-Flyer founded in 2015, both based in Hangzhou, exemplifies the success of the CCP’s centralized model. High-Flyer’s development of the Fire-Flyer supercomputers in Hangzhou (I in 2020 and II in 2023) provided the foundational infrastructure for DS’s AI research, including its landmark R1 model. The Fire-Flyer systems were likely deployed in Hangzhou’s AI innovation ecosystem, benefiting from government incentives and shared infrastructure.

DeepSeek's founder, Liang Wenfeng, also and uncoincidentally participated in a symposium hosted by Premier Li Qiang on January 20, 2025 (upon the R1 release), where he, along with other experts and entrepreneurs, provided input on the draft Government Work Report. The Government Work Report is a comprehensive annual policy document presented by the Chinese Premier during the National People’s Congress (NPC), outlining the central government’s priorities, achievements, and goals for the coming year. It serves as a key roadmap for national development and governance. This involvement indicates recognition at the national level and directly implicates DeepSeek's development as a direct participant in locally-driven political affairs that saw its development in Hangzhou.

China’s AI ecosystem operates as a centralized, cascading system, where local and national governments align resources and policies with state priorities. Hangzhou’s status as a leading AI hub is directly tied to this model, as its infrastructure and policy support allowed companies like High-Flyer and DeepSeek to scale rapidly. By focusing on AI-enabled industrial applications, talent development, and reducing the costs of AI model training, China has built a cohesive pipeline from innovation to application, tightly controlled by the CCP to ensure alignment with national security and economic goals.

This highly integrated strategy highlights how China’s AI agenda extends beyond technology, embedding AI into its governance and global ambitions. DeepSeek’s cost-effective AGI research contributes to China’s ability to scale AI across military and civilian domains, securing its role as a global leader while limiting dependencies on foreign technologies.

The US AI Approach (2017–2025): A Fragmented Strategy in an Era of Global AI Competition

The US AI ecosystem has long been a powerhouse of innovation, yet its development has been fragmented, reactive, and largely driven by the private sector rather than a cohesive national strategy. Unlike China’s centralized approach, the US has relied on commercial leadership, with government agencies playing a supporting role through programs like DARPA’s AI research, NSF funding, and limited DoD initiatives like the Joint AI Center (JAIC) and the newer Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO).

Federal involvement in AI has historically been decentralized, with multiple agencies funding and directing AI research in silos. DARPA has led military-focused AI research since the 1960s, the NSF has funded fundamental AI and machine learning advancements, and the Department of Energy (DOE) has driven high-performance computing initiatives. However, these agencies have lacked a unifying framework that points to a national strategy, leading to inefficiencies in translating innovation into national security or economic competitiveness.

While the US remains a leader in commercial AI—thanks to firms like OpenAI, Google, and Microsoft—its lack of a coordinated strategy has led to systemic vulnerabilities. This fragmentation has resulted in redundancy, delayed deployment, and an overreliance on short-term market incentives rather than national AI development.

Attempts at Coordination: The American AI Initiative & the National AI Initiative Act

The American AI Initiative, introduced by President Trump in 2019, marked the first formal attempt to prioritize AI development at the federal level. However, it was largely symbolic, as it lacked dedicated funding and enforceable mandates, leaving much of the responsibility to individual agencies and private-sector actors. This initiative attempted to unify disparate efforts under a broader strategy but failed to provide the necessary resources and coordination to execute on its vision.

The National AI Initiative Act of 2021 sought to address these gaps by establishing the National AI Initiative Office (NAIIO) to coordinate AI research and policy. However, the NAIIO’s authority remained limited, and governance remained fragmented across multiple agencies, leading to inconsistencies in investment priorities and long-term AI planning. Furthermore, shifting political priorities have meant that US AI policy has been subject to frequent changes, further exacerbating uncertainty in both government and industry. A notable recent example of fragmentation includes the establishment of the US Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute (US AISI) within NIST.

Infrastructure Gaps and Strategic Risks

Unlike China’s top-down approach, where the government funds AI-specific supercomputing centers and data infrastructure, the US lacks a comparable state-backed AI infrastructure initiative. In the waning days of the Biden Administration, Executive Order (EO) 14141 attempted to rectify this situation by making Federal land available for such infrastructure. Most AI compute resources remain concentrated in a handful of private companies, leaving national security AI projects dependent on commercial cloud providers like Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, and AWS. The Biden Administration had attempted to create established national guidelines for AI safety and equity with EO 14110, however, in early 2025, it was rescinded. Instead the new Trump administration has solicited a Request for Information (RFI) on a National AI Action Plan.

Additionally, the US has struggled with talent retention and workforce alignment. While China integrates AI education into its national curriculum and channels talent into state-prioritized AI sectors, the US has largely left workforce development to market forces. The result is an AI talent gap in key national security domains, where expertise is either concentrated in private-sector AI labs or lost to foreign competition.

The Disjointed Approach to Military AI Integration

China’s AI strategy seamlessly integrates military, commercial, and academic innovation, whereas the US military’s approach to AI has been marked by bureaucratic delays and inefficiencies. The Department of Defense (DoD) launched JAIC in 2018 to centralize AI adoption across military branches, but it struggled with execution and bureaucratic resistance. By 2022, the JAIC was merged into the DoD CDAO in an effort to streamline AI and digital transformation, but progress has remained slow compared to China’s rapid military AI adoption.

Moreover, defense-oriented AI programs such as Project Maven—which sought to use AI for intelligence analysis—have faced backlash from industry employees and human rights advocates, leading to tensions between the private sector and national security interests. Although this tension has since subsided, it significantly offset the progress of the program. This contrast sharply with China’s AI ecosystem, where government-aligned firms face no such ethical resistance to military applications.

A Path Forward: Strengthening the US AI Strategy

If the US is to maintain its leadership in AI, it must reject incrementalism and act decisively to close the gaps in its AI strategy. The following reforms, some of which are occuring piecemeal, are essential:

1. National AI Infrastructure – Establish Federally funded AI supercomputing centers and secure access to AI-specific semiconductor supply chains, reducing dependence on commercial cloud providers and foreign chip manufacturers.

2. Strategic Public-Private Partnerships or Compacts – Expand government-industry collaboration to align private-sector AI research with national security and economic goals, ensuring AI breakthroughs translate into tangible national advantages. This includes incentivizing US companies to invest in AI infrastructure through tax breaks, grants, and streamlined procurement mechanisms.

3. AI Workforce Development – Implement a federally supported AI talent pipeline, including AI-focused university programs, national security fellowships, and visa reforms to attract global AI talent.

4. Defense AI Modernization – Accelerate the integration of AI across military and intelligence domains, improving the efficiency of AI adoption through streamlined procurement and innovation hubs within the DoD.

5. Long-Term AI Research Investment – Fund AI research beyond commercial applications, focusing on foundational advancements in artificial general intelligence (AGI), next-generation machine learning, and AI safety research.

6. National AI Doctrine – Establish a unified federal AI authority beyond just NAIIO to drive a coordinated, long-term AI strategy. We should lean in on developing global AI standards rooted in democratic principles, offering an alternative to China’s authoritarian model.

The Future Belongs to Those Who Act

The US has significant talent, venerated companies, and the intellectual firepower to lead AI—but lacks the decisive national strategy to translate innovation into dominance. While China’s centralized model is incompatible with democratic values, that does not mean we should continue sleepwalking through decentralized inefficiency. AI is a national security priority, and if we fail to act with urgency, we will find ourselves following rather than leading. The US must stop managing AI like a private-sector playground and start treating it as a critical pillar of economic and defense power. We don’t need to mimic China—we need to outmaneuver them. That means aligning state incentives with industrial ambition, fast-tracking AI infrastructure investments, and rejecting bureaucratic hesitation. It’s time to break inertia. The future isn’t won by those who wait—it’s won by those who move.

The Problem of Mission Creep

I recently learned that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) maintains its own police force, which seems emblematic of the broader institutional dysfunction within the Department of Defense (DoD).

The DoD has metastasized into a bureaucratic leviathan, encumbered with an unsustainable proliferation of responsibilities that extend far beyond its foundational purpose: the orchestration of national defense through the projection of military power.

This expansive mission creep has attenuated its operational efficacy, diverting strategic focus away from warfighting and deterrence, while encumbering it with extraneous functions that could be more effectively managed by other federal agencies, private industry, or international partnerships.

The Distorted Market for Military Innovation

The increasing investment from venture capital (VC) into defense technology startups is a symptom of this inefficiency rather than an endorsement of a new paradigm in national security. In a rationally structured defense ecosystem, innovation in military technology would emerge organically from the private sector, with the DoD acting as a sophisticated and discerning buyer rather than an overbearing incubator. However, DoD inefficiencies have created a distorted market in which VC-backed firms circumvent bureaucratic inertia, capitalizing on decentralized technological advancement. Rather than serving as an accelerator for military innovation, the DoD’s risk-averse procurement practices and labyrinthine bureaucratic processes have inadvertently ceded control over technological momentum to the private sector, forcing workarounds that further complicate state oversight and strategic alignment.

The Historical Role of the DoD

From a historical perspective, the DoD was never designed to be an omnipotent force responsible for all facets of national security. The contemporary model deviates starkly from past operational structures, where the US relied on distributed innovation ecosystems led by universities, research institutions, and private enterprise. The post-Cold War shift toward expansive nation-building, global peacekeeping, cyber defense, disaster response, technology development—the list goes on—has burdened the DoD with an untenable mandate, resulting in diminished agility and inefficacious resource allocation. This drift has engendered a reactive and cumbersome bureaucracy incapable of adapting to emergent security threats at the requisite speed and scale. Additionally, the inability of centralized bureaucratic structures to effectively integrate emergent technologies into national security strategy has further compounded inefficiencies, leading to stagnation in military readiness and adaptability.

Reorienting Capability Development

Historically, the preeminence of US military innovation was predicated on a decentralized approach to research and development, wherein institutions such as the Manhattan Project, Skunk Works, and Bell Labs pioneered transformative technologies independent of bureaucratic micromanagement. The contemporary DoD acquisition system, by contrast, is an impediment to rapid technological advancement. Even ostensibly progressive mechanisms such as Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements are encumbered by institutional inertia, leading to elongated development cycles and suboptimal warfighter adoption. The DoD’s insistence on internalizing technological development has created redundant layers of inefficiency that ultimately stagnate mission-critical advancements. Furthermore, as adversarial states refine their asymmetric capabilities through state-backed innovation hubs, the inefficiencies inherent in the DoD’s development model represent a significant strategic liability.

A Vision for a More Agile DoD

Rather than merely reducing bureaucracy, the DoD must be reimagined as an organization optimized for strategic agility, rapid decision-making, and operational efficiency.

A more agile DoD would emphasize mission execution over bureaucratic process, streamline decision-making structures, and reduce redundancy in capability development.

This requires identifying the structural impediments to speed and efficacy, from the bloated acquisition process to the rigid compliance culture that prioritizes risk aversion over battlefield readiness. This new model would enable the DoD to partner dynamically with industry, ensuring that technological innovation is deployed in real-time to the warfighter rather than getting stuck in years of procurement cycles.

Tactical vs. Strategic Inefficiencies

Not all inefficiencies are created equal. Tactical inefficiencies, such as slow fielding of weapons and equipment, have an immediate impact on warfighters. Strategic inefficiencies, such as redundant oversight layers, slow decision-making, and fragmented leadership structures, erode long-term effectiveness. Addressing both requires an aggressive restructuring effort that separates essential functions from those that dilute operational focus. For instance, the current system rewards process adherence over mission success, resulting in a culture where bureaucratic survival takes precedence over warfighting effectiveness. A mission-first restructuring would remove these inefficiencies, prioritizing speed, adaptability, and accountability.

The Role of Leadership in Overhauling the System

Bureaucracies neither reform themselves nor become bureaucracies overnight. Without a decisive shift in leadership philosophy, attempts at DoD restructuring will be incremental at best. Within this structure, wisdom also dictates that a more effective force is a whole force greater than the sum of its parts. Reform must be driven by leaders who reject incrementalism in favor of radical transformation in both theory and application. This means empowering mission-driven leadership over compliance-focused administrators, restructuring accountability to prioritize warfighter outcomes, and ensuring that leadership positions are occupied by individuals committed to the acceleration of operational effectiveness, embracing a diversity of ideas, rather than the perpetuation of bureaucratic inertia. A top-down restructuring of authority is necessary to ensure that responsibility for outcomes is clear, decision-making cycles are shortened, and accountability for failure is enforced.

Implications for National Strategy

The structure of the DoD determines how the US fights wars, engages in global deterrence, and integrates emerging technologies into national security. The current bureaucratic sprawl inhibits innovation, slows true force modernization, and fosters an outdated strategic posture that is reactive rather than proactive. A streamlined DoD would enable rapid deployment of emerging technologies, improve force agility, and ensure that the US retains its strategic advantage over peer competitors. Failing to reform the DoD’s structure means ceding the future battlespace to adversaries who are unencumbered by such inefficiencies.

Proposed Structural Reforms

• Prioritization of Core Military Functions: The DoD must realign its operational priorities around warfighting readiness, strategic deterrence, and actionable grand strategy. Ancillary functions, such as administration, health, and welfare, should be systematically offloaded to civilian agencies and industry actors to streamline efficiency.

• Transformation of the DoD Procurement Model: The department must transition from a technology developer to a strategic buyer, leveraging private sector innovation through outcome-oriented contracting structures. This requires an abandonment of archaic acquisition models and processes that prioritize bureaucratic control over agility.

• Divestiture of Non-Core Responsibilities: A comprehensive audit of DoD functions should be conducted to identify and offload responsibilities that do not directly contribute to national security, lethality, deterrence, or strategic preparedness. Areas such as welfare, logistics, data processing, and specific cyber operations should be transitioned to private sector management where appropriate.

• Mitigation of Bureaucratic Bloat: The unchecked expansion of DoD administrative structures has led to an institution that prioritizes self-preservation over operational effectiveness. Reforms should emphasize the reduction of redundant oversight mechanisms and streamline decision-making processes to accelerate capability deployment.

• Reinvestment in Specialization and Lethality: A more focused and streamlined DoD will be inherently more resilient in conflict. Resources should be directed toward areas of asymmetric advantage, such as advanced command and control systems, strategic deterrence capabilities, and specialized autonomy forces. Greater emphasis must also be placed on integrating AI-enabled battlefield decision-making tools to enhance efficiency and mitigate human error.

The Urgency of Reform

The military superiority of the US will not be maintained through incremental adjustments but through a fundamental restructuring of how the DoD operates. Without decisive action, the DoD risks exacerbating its own obsolescence in an era where speed, precision, and adaptability define military preeminence. The future of warfare is not about expanding bureaucracy but about optimizing decision cycles, leveraging private sector innovation, and ensuring that warfighters have the tools they need to win decisively.

If the US is to maintain its strategic dominance, it must move beyond bureaucratic self-preservation and embrace a warfighting-first mentality—one that is as agile, adaptable, and mission-focused in the conflicts it seeks to deter.

For too long, the US national security apparatus has been defined by inertia—an institutional tendency to sustain the status quo, overcommit to outdated strategies, and spend trillions on incremental progress while ignoring the transformative potential of new ideas. In an era of rapid technological advancement, shifting geopolitical landscapes, and economic realignment, the old ways of doing business are not just ineffective; they are actively dangerous. ActionThis.Day exists to challenge that inertia.

Winston Churchill, in the depths of World War II, would mark certain directives with the phrase Action This Day—an unambiguous command for immediate execution. Churchill’s approach cut through bureaucracy, eliminated hesitation, and made clear that survival depended on movement. While Churchill’s urgency was forged in the fires of existential war, the philosophy remains relevant in today’s national security environment, albeit in a different way. We are not just fighting adversaries; we are fighting stagnation, inefficiency, and a system that prioritizes preservation over progress.

This publication is about acceleration—reform, resilience, reindustrialization, and transformation. We aim to identify the choke points that hinder progress and build ways to break through them. We are rejecting the comforting illusion of incrementalism and advocating for bold, systemic change. Above all, ActionThis.Day is about refusing to accept that the future of US national security must be dictated by the rigid constraints of the past.

The Need for Urgency

America’s national security complex is built on institutions that were designed for the industrial age, adapted for the Cold War, and then stretched into the 21st century with patchwork reforms. The world has changed, yet our approach to warfighting, deterrence, and defense innovation has remained largely static. We still operate within a paradigm where procurement cycles take decades, where bureaucracy is rewarded, and where new ideas are often met with suspicion rather than curiosity.

Meanwhile, our adversaries are not waiting. China is investing heavily in dual-use technologies, integrating commercial advancements directly into military applications. Russia, despite its economic constraints, continues to experiment with asymmetric capabilities that maximize disruption at minimal cost. Non-state actors are leveraging AI, cyber tools, and decentralized networks faster than traditional intelligence models can keep up. The US, despite its immense technological and financial advantage, remains mired in an approach that equates spending with progress rather than effectiveness.

We must recognize that the nature of security is evolving. The future of deterrence, warfighting, and resilience will not be defined solely by traditional military strength but by the ability to adapt faster than the competition. If national security is to remain viable, it must become agile in every real way rather than just on paper. We will focus on the key themes of Reform, Resilience, and Reindustrialization with an added focus on Transformation through progress no checkboxes.

Reform: Breaking Structural Stagnation

The first step in acceleration is reform—not as a slogan, but as an operating principle. This means challenging the deeply entrenched processes that slow progress and reward mediocrity. It means questioning procurement timelines that make next-generation systems obsolete before they are deployed. Reforms should not only demand accountability for the way trillions of taxpayer dollars are spent, not just in terms of financial audits, but also in terms of the real-world impact of those expenditures.

Reform must extend beyond bureaucratic streamlining. Any reform initiatives must include implementing strategies about how we cultivate talent, how we leverage commercial innovation, and how we integrate emerging technologies without waiting for lengthy vetting cycles. The system must evolve from one of rigid, siloed institutions to one that thrives on adaptability, cross-domain expertise, and continuous iteration.

Resilience: Rethinking National Strength

For decades, resilience in national security has been narrowly defined in terms of physical infrastructure, supply chain durability, and force readiness. These elements remain crucial, but resilience in the modern era requires a broader approach. The US and our Allies must remain at the forefront of foundational technologies—semiconductors, artificial intelligence, bioengineering, space infrastructure, and quantum computing—not just as capabilities but as integral components of our strategic posture. This means acknowledging, across society, that economic strength, industrial capacity, and technological dominance are as critical to security as any weapons system.

Resilience is also cultural. A nation’s ability to withstand shocks—whether economic, technological, or military—depends on its willingness to embrace change rather than resist it. This is where the national security community must shift its mindset. Instead of seeing disruption as a risk, it must see it as an opportunity.

Reindustrialization: The Backbone of Security

Decades of offshoring and deindustrialization have weakened America’s ability to sustain itself in a protracted geopolitical competition. The US national security establishment has largely treated industrial policy as an adjacent issue, rather than a core component of security strategy. That must change.

The US cannot afford to rely on fragile global supply chains for critical defense and technology inputs. The reindustrialization of key sectors—semiconductors, rare earth minerals, advanced manufacturing, and energy independence—must be treated with the same level of urgency as military readiness. Without a robust industrial base, no amount of defense spending will compensate for strategic vulnerability.

Reindustrialization also extends to workforce development. A secure nation is one that can produce, innovate, and adapt from within. Investing in the next generation of scientists, engineers, and defense technologists is as vital as investing in next-generation weapons systems.

Transformation: Thinking Beyond Incrementalism

Perhaps the most difficult but necessary shift in national security thinking is a rejection of incrementalism. The tendency to rely on minor updates, legacy platforms, and evolutionary rather than revolutionary thinking has led to a security posture that is often reactive rather than proactive.

Transformation requires boldness, questioning the assumption that defense innovation must come exclusively from within the traditional defense industrial base. We must embrace commercial space, AI-driven defense applications, and new models of decentralized intelligence gathering. National security is no longer confined to government agencies but is increasingly tied to private sector breakthroughs, from synthetic biology to next-generation energy solutions.

The goal is to not rely on technology alone—incorporate doctrine, strategy, and mindset. We cannot afford to simply modernize existing structures; we must be willing to rethink them entirely. What does deterrence look like in an era of autonomous systems? What role does economic warfare play in shaping geopolitical outcomes? How do we transition from a defense bureaucracy built for static threats to one that thrives in a world defined by constant flux?

These are the questions ActionThis.Day will explore.

A Call to Action

This publication is not for those who are comfortable with business as usual. Our aim is to reach those who believe that national security must move faster, think bigger, and embrace change at the speed of relevance. Join us if you also reject the notion that bureaucracy and sluggishness are inevitable. The future is won by those who act—not tomorrow, not next year, but this day.

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The status quo will not protect us. Advancement, adaptation, and decisive action will.

Welcome to ActionThis.Day. The fight against inertia starts now.